Download PDF 
(PDF, 256k)
David Schenker is a senior fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Near East Report: How much political power does Hizballah have in the Lebanese government?
David Schenker: Last May, Hizballah emerged from the Doha Agreement [a power-sharing deal among rival Lebanese factions] with more de jure power. They were granted a blocking third in the government. That means one-third of the cabinet seats plus one will belong to Hizballah and its allies. This will enable them to block any major government initiatives.
But the Doha Agreement does not really represent a change in the status quo because, as we saw, Hizballah already had the ability to block government policies. Last May, the central government had decided to remove the pro-Hizballah Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) officer in charge of the Beirut airport, and to dismantle Hizballah’s illegal telecommunications network. But when Hizballah didn’t like these decisions, they rejected them and attacked Beirut.
I don’t think the Doha Agreement brings about any real change on the ground, but psychologically, the reincorporation of Hizballah into the Lebanese government is incredibly damaging and a big setback for the Western-backed democratically elected government. It also showed how little the United States could do to protect its allies in Beirut from Hizballah.
NER: Should the U.S. continue giving military assistance to the LAF, which has cooperated with Hizballah in the past?
DS: The Bush administration has tried to strengthen the government of Lebanon through the provision of robust assistance to the LAF. Over the past two or three years, Lebanon has become the second largest per capita recipient of U.S. foreign military aid, behind Israel.
But the LAF is constrained because it is comprised of the same ethnic and religious composition as the rest of the country. The fear is that if the LAF is tasked with a politically controverstial mission, it will fracture. In any event, there is little concern LAF weapons will be transferred to Hizballah—the organization has its own highly advanced equipment already.
Recognizing these limitiations, U.S. focus has been to try to build an institution. In this context, the policy makes sense.
NER: What are American goals in supporting the military and other pro-Western forces in Lebanon?
DS: U.S. support for the LAF serves two purposes. It enables the LAF to take on non-controversial counterterrorism missions against al-Qaeda or Fatah al-Islam. This is good for maintaining security in Lebanon. It’s in our interest that Lebanon defeat these groups and not allow them to establish another base of support in the Middle East, which is something that could happen, given how weak the central government is.
Washington has realistic expectations about what the LAF can and will do vis-à-vis Hizballah, given the composition of the military and the fact that the military itself would not fare particularly well against Hizballah in a direct confrontation.
In building up the Lebanese army, the U.S. is trying to strengthen one of the few, if not the only, respected national institutions—to create the ethos of national belonging, so that someday this organization may be able to carry out the orders given to it by the central government. The U.S. doesn’t anticipate this will happen any time soon. Maybe in a decade, but they believe it’s a worthwhile investment.
NER: What is Hizballah’s current military strength?
DS: Nasrallah has said that Hizballah possesses up to 80,000 rockets and missiles—some 30,000 of these south of the Litani River—in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. Everyone agrees that Hizballah has rearmed, including Ban Ki-moon and Terje Roed-Larsen. Hizballah has retrenched, rearmed, and they are ready to go when the decision is made.
Resolution 1701 was supposed to prohibit Hizballah rearming itself as a military power south of the Litani. Hizballah has dug in just north of the Litani with bunkers and ammunition, just like they had south of the Litani before the war. And we know that Hizballah has established a comprehensive fiber optic network south of the Litani, which enabled Hizballah to maintain secure communications during the war with Israel in 2006. Now we’ve learned that the same line reaches much farther to the north, near Beirut. Hizballah really has reestablished itself.
NER: What should we expect to see in Lebanon in the coming year?
DS: We’re going to be treading water until the Lebanese elections in 2009. Lebanon chose a new president, but General Suleiman is not a panacea. I worry that the international coalition around Lebanon is eroding. The French, who have been so good on Lebanon, have invited Assad to Paris to talk about Lebanon. Lebanon fatigue is setting in. The international community appears to be losing steam.
The one point of pressure that Lebanon has against its enemies is the international tribunal. It’s widely believed that Syria is going to be implicated in the 2005 murder of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, but Hizballah may take certain steps in the cabinet to undermine Lebanese support for the tribunal, to protect Syria.
It will be critical for this tribunal to issue indictments as soon as possible so that this one point of leverage on the Syrians will not evaporate. If it does, this will be the end of the “Cedar Revolution” and a real setback for the United States and for Lebanon. •NER•
